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11 Introduction
Over the past decade there has been a renewed interest among economists
and policy makers in the in‡uence of capital market imperfections on the
operating behaviour of …rms. Firms’ investment and …nancial decisions will
generally not be independent if the cost or availability of internal and ex-
ternal …nance di¤er from each other. This is an important issue since the
presence of a link between …rms’ real and …nancial activity may give rise to
a …nancial propagation mechanism, amplifying the e¤ects of business cycles
and monetary policy, and hence having important policy implications.
The notion of such a real-…nancial link …nds support in empirical research.
There is a large body of microeconometric evidence, relating to capital in-
vestment, indicating that …nancial factors, such as the availability of internal
funds or the debt position, are important for explaining variations in …rms’
capital expenditures. There is also evidence that this dependency varies over
di¤erent groups of …rms with di¤erent …nancial and institutional characteris-
tics.1 A more limited literature has directed attention towards …rms’ labour
demand, reaching similar conclusions.2
1See, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen (1988), Whited (1992), Kashyap, Lamont &
Stein (1994), and Hubbard, Kashyap & Whited (1995) for the United States; Devereux
& Schiantarelli (1990), Blundell, Bond, Devereux & Schiantarelli (1992), and Bond &
Meghir (1994) for the United Kingdom; Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein (1991) for Japan;
and Hansen & Lindberg (1997) for Sweden.
2See the contributions of, e.g., Nickell & Wadhwani (1991), Frisse, Funke & Lankes
(1992), Sharpe (1994), and Nickell & Nicolitsas (1995).
1In this paper, we provide further evidence for the in‡uence of …rms’ …-
nancial policy on their employment decisions, using a large panel of Swedish
manufacturing …rms over the period 1979-88. While in previous studies …-
nancial factors have been included into traditional labour demand equations
on an ad hoc basis, the aim of the current paper is to derive a model which
is consistent with the endogenous nature of both the employment and the
…nancial decision. To achieve this, we adopt the hierarchy of …nance ap-
proach to corporate …nance, and derive the set of Euler equations governing
the optimal path of employment in the presence of convex adjustments costs
of labour.
A hierarchy of …nance may arise for several reasons, including tax dis-
crimination, agency costs, asymmetric information, and costs of …nancial
distress. It implies that …rms face a hierarchy of …nancial costs associated
with di¤erent sources of …nance. For our purposes, we introduce corporate
taxation and agency costs of debt into a standard dynamic model of labour
demand. When the …rm solves its intertemporal optimisation problem, it
will acknowledge these distortions and take them into account accordingly.
The …rm’s employment and …nancing decisions will hence be determined si-
multaneously, which, as we will show, has testable implications for the Euler
equation. The analysis is con…ned to the choice between retained earnings
and debt …nance; thus, new equity …nancing is disregarded. This abstraction
may be justi…ed because debt is a more important source of incremental …-
nance — in average, only 3.7 percent of Swedish corporate …rms issued new
2equity over the period 1979-95.3
As noted by Bond & Meghir (1994), the theory of a hierarchy of …nance
predicts that some …rms may in any period be in a regime in which oper-
ations are constrained by the availability of internal funds. Moreover, the
probability to be in either regime is both time-varying and endogenous in
the investment equation. These observations motivated Bond and Meghir to
test for di¤erences in the investment behaviour of …rms across di¤erent …nan-
cial regimes. We develop a similar test in this paper. Our model implies that
if the …rm has exhausted its retained earnings, the employment Euler equa-
tion will include a term measuring the degree of …nancial leverage. Financial
leverage will hence only be important for those …rms that do not have access
to internally generated funds, and the hypothesis of a hierarchy of …nancial
costs can be tested by comparing the coe¢cients on the debt ratio between
these and other …rms.
The Euler equation of employment is estimated using the Generalized
Method of Moment estimator (GMM) proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991).
Unfortunately, this estimator tends to perform poorly in …nite samples. In
particular, the asymptotic standard errors may be severely downward biased.
As a remedy to this …nite sample problem, however, several GMM-bootstrap
procedures have been suggested4. Consequently, we assist our inference using
the bootstrap procedure proposed by Brown & Newey (1995).
Our empirical …ndings suggest that the Euler equation of employment
3This average is obtained from the entire Costa data-base, described below.
4See, e.g, Brown & Newey (1995) and Hall & Horowitz (1996). For a comparison
between these two, see Bergström, Dahlberg & Johansson (1997).
3gives rise to a reasonably well speci…ed model. Although the long-run prop-
erties of the model may be questionable, we …nd support for the hypothesis
of a hierarchy of …nancial costs. There is a clear indication that the …nan-
cial leverage capturing the agency costs exerts a signi…cant in‡uence on the
labour demand for those …rms that are in a regime in which they are liquid-
ity constrained in the sense that internally generated funds are exhausted.
However, because of the violation of the long-run properties of the model
(which by no means is uncommon feature of empirical Euler equations) we
thought it would be desirable to supplement the Euler equation analysis with
an analysis of the labour demand relation in form of a behavioral equation.
Failing to obtain a closed form solution of the labour demand relation from
our model, we did this by estimating a ”suggestive” labour demand equa-
tion, the properties of which can be intuitively motivated from our theory.
This labour demand equation is similar in spirit to the model in Nickell &
Nicolitsas (1995), and the results obtained con…rm our previous …ndings on
the implications of a hierarchy of …nancial costs.
The paper is organised as follows: The next section brie‡y reviews previ-
ous work in this …eld and outlines the theoretical foundation for our model.
In section 3, we derive the Euler equation describing the optimal path of
employment in the presence of capital market imperfections and convex ad-
justment costs. Section 4 describes the data and the sample selection proce-
dure that we use. It also gives a brief account of the empirical procedures,
including the bootstrap tests used. The econometric results are reported in
section 5, while section 6 concludes.
42 Financial policy and labour demand
There is only a handful of empirical studies investigating the link between
a …rm’s …nancial policy and its employment decisions, but the overall con-
clusion is that the …rm’s debt position seems to exert a substantial in‡uence
onto labour demand. Introducing various …nancial variables into a dynamic
labour demand schedule given by a standard bargaining model, Nickell &
Wadhwani (1991) …nd a signi…cant impact of the debt to equity ratio for a
panel of British …rms. In a related study, Nickell & Nicolitsas (1995) …nd
that an increase in interest payments relative to cash ‡ow has a large nega-
tive e¤ect on employment, and that this e¤ect is greater for …rms that are
relatively smaller or relatively more highly leveraged. Frisse et al. (1992)
obtains similar results for German …rms, using a static model of labour de-
mand. Finally, Sharpe (1994) …nds a signi…cant relationship between the
…nancial leverage of U.S. …rms and the cyclicality of their work forces over
the 1959-85 period. This cyclicality was moreover inversely related to size
of the …rm. The results suggest that the macroeconomy becomes more sen-
sitive to disturbances as …nancial leverage increases, and that smaller and
more highly leveraged …rms tend to be less prone to hoard labour.
The Sharpe (1994) study, in particular, touches on and lends direct sup-
port to the notion that …nancial leverage has an important role as a propaga-
tion mechanism in business cycles and in the transmission of monetary policy
to the economy. Recent macroeconomic literature gives two complementary
views on the operation of the …nancial propagation mechanism, both of which
5are based on problem of asymmetric information in …nancial markets.5
The …rst view is the credit view, which emphasises the availability of
credit and the role played by banks as intermediaries. It is based on the
presumption that banks play a special role in the …nancial system as they
are especially well suited to solve asymmetric information problems in credit
markets. Because of this special role of the banks, some borrowers will not
have access to credit markets unless they borrow from banks. So if the funds
available for bank lending (i.e., deposits less reserve holdings and operating
costs) are reduced due to tighter monetary policy or some macroeconomic
disturbance, investment spending will consequently decline. This e¤ect will
be further reinforced if banks react to the reduction of loanable funds by
setting the interest rate below the market clearing level, thereby rationing
credit.
The second view, the balance sheet view, stresses the creditworthiness of
borrowers, suggesting that swings in the balance sheets will amplify swings
in spending. The logic behind this is that a weaker balance sheet position
of potential loan applicants will be perceived by creditors as a greater risk,
for which they need to be compensated. The creditworthiness of borrowers,
commonly measured asthe level of net worth, is thuslikely to a¤ect the size of
the agency costs associated with any …nancial arrangement. Since borrowers’
net worth are likely to be procyclical, agency costs tend to decline in booms
and rise in recessions. By the same reasoning, agency costs are also likely to
5For a comprehensive overview of the litterature on …nancial and real interaction, see
Gertler (1988) and Kashyap & Stein (1993).
6be higher whenever monetary policy is tight.
The aimof this paper is not to study the …nancial propagation mechanism
over business cycles and various monetary regimes as such, but rather to
investigate the in‡uence of …nancial leverage on the employment decisions of
individual …rms, in the context of the hierarchy of …nance model. However,
since the analysis is based on credit market imperfections of the same type
crucial to the operation of the balance sheet channel, our conclusions may
also indirectly relate to the question of whether or not such a propagation
mechanism indeed is in e¤ect.
Our study extends previous research in this area by incorporating …nan-
cial considerations explicitly into the …rm’s maximisation problem, and not
just, ad hoc, adding …nancial variables to the labour demand relation. Ex-
cept for the inclusion of capital market imperfections, the basic features of the
model follow Machin, Manning & Meghir (1993), and the empirical analysis
is based on the Euler equation governing the optimal path of employment in
the presence of convex adjustment costs of labour.
We assume that the …rm can …nance employment and investment ex-
penditures by internally generated funds or by debt, thus disregarding new
equity …nance. Debt …nance is assumed to have a tax advantage to retained
earnings, but to be associated with agency problems due to asymmetric in-
formation. Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) showed that the
limited liability provision of debt contracts creates incentives for …rm man-
agers to act in de…ance of the interest of creditors in order to increase the
rate of return to the shareholder. Since potential creditors will acknowledge
7the incentive problem, as well as the risk of bankruptcy, they will demand
either interest rate premiums or bond covenants to restrict the behaviour of
the management with respect to new debt issues, dividends, and the main-
tenance of working capital. The costs that arise in these situations are com-
monly known as agency costs. These costs are likely to increase with the
degree of leverage, since a greater debt to equity ratio means a greater incen-
tive for managers to diverge. Debt …nance will therefore become increasingly
expensive as …nancial leverage rises, but still be the preferred source of funds
at low levels of borrowing, because of the tax shield.
The …rm will thus be facing a hierarchy of costs associated with the two
sources of funds. Three …nancial regimes will emerge: In the …rst regime, the
…rm will …nance investment spending solely by debt, up to the point where
the marginal cost of debt equals the marginal cost of retained earnings. Any
pro…ts will be entirely distributed to the shareholders. In the second regime,
marginal investments will be …nanced by internally generated funds at the
expense of extra dividends. Finally, when retentions are fully exhausted, the
…rm will be in the third regime, and higher levels of investment must be
…nanced by additional debt.
In reality, …rms will never, or just rarely, be in the …rst regime. Less
than one percent of the …rms in the CoSta data-base6 distribute their entire
pro…ts as dividends.7 We will therefore in the empirical study focus only
on the second and third regimes. It turns out that the …nancing hierarchy
6See below for a description.
7Calculating this ratio, we have corrected for the fact that …rms are allowed to fund a
certain share of their pro…ts each year, thus postponing taxation of these funded pro…ts.
8implies that …nancial leverage, measured as the debt to capital ratio, will
enter into the employment Euler equation only for those …rms that are in
the latter regime; i.e., …rms who do not have access to internally generated
funds. These …rms can be identi…ed as those not paying dividends in two
consecutive periods, and the …nancial hierarchy hypothesis can be evaluated
by testing for di¤erences in the debt coe¢cients over …rms in the two …nancial
regimes. The formal model is developed in the following section.
3 The Model
3.1 Theoretical model
We consider a competitive …rm operating in a world of imperfect capital
markets. The managers and shareholders of the …rm are assumed to be risk
neutral. We also assume that the managers make their operating decisions in
the beginning of each period, that they have rational expectations, and that
they act on behalf of the shareholders in order to maximise the value of the
…rm. Labour and capital are assumed to be quasi-…xed input factors; hence,
changes in these factors will entail positive adjustment costs. To focus on
the employment decisions and to simplify the analysis, we assume that the
adjustment cost function is additively separable in investment and hires, and
we treat capital as predetermined.






value of the …rm at the beginning of period t is given by the expected present















where Dit is the dividends paid in period t and ¯t represents the …rm’s
one-period discount factor. The discount factor is de…ned as ¯t+k¡1 = 1
for k = 0 and ¯t+k¡1 = (1 + rt+k¡1)
¡1 for k = 1;2;:::;1, where rt is the
shareholders’ required nominal rate of return between periods t and t + 1.
Finally, E [¢ j -t] = Et [¢] denotes the expectations operator conditional on
information available in period t.8
The dividends are de…ned by the identity of sources and uses of funds
which states that cash in‡ows must equal cash out‡ows:
Dit = (1 ¡ ¿)[F (Nit;Kit;Xit) ¡ G(Hit) ¡ WitNit ¡ it¡1Bi;t¡1
¡A(Bi;t¡1;Ki;t¡1)] + Bit ¡ (1 ¡ ¼t)Bi;t¡1: (2)
Here F (Nit;Kit;Xit) denotesthe real revenue function (denominated interms
of the output price), where Nit is labour, Kit is capital, and Xit is all other
types of input factors. Revenues are assumed to be increasing at a decreasing
rate with labour. G(Hit) is the real adjustment cost function, assumed to
be increasing and convex in hires, Hit, which is de…ned as
Hit = Nit ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Ni;t¡1: (3)
8Uncertainty may come from a number of factors, such as future interest rates, input/
output prices, and technologies.
10where 0 · ± · 1 is the voluntary quit rate. A(Bi;t¡1;Ki;t¡1) is the agency
cost function, where Bi;t¡1 is the amount of one-period real debt issued in the
previous period and Ki;t¡1 is the capital stock, here representing collateral.
The agency costs are assumed to be increasing at an increasing rate in the
level of debt, but decreasing in the level of capital. Finally, Wit is the real
wage cost, it¡1 the nominal interest rate paid on loans taken in period t¡ 1,
¿ the corporate tax-rate, and ¼t the rate of product price in‡ation between
period t ¡ 1 and t.
Thus, equation (2) states that the dividend payouts must be equal to the
sum of after-tax pro…ts and the change in the stock of debt. In addition,
dividends are restricted to be non-negative:
Dit ¸ 0: (4)
Now, the …rm’s objective is to choose the levels of employment and debt
so as to maximize its value, equation (1), subject to the constraints (2), (3),
and (4). To solve this problem, form the Lagrangian function, letting ¸it be
the series of (current value) Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with (4) and
substituting for Dit and Hit using (2) and (3). The …rst order conditions for




























for any period t = 0;1;:::;1. Equation (5) is the Euler equation, charac-
terising the optimal path of hirings along which the …rm will be indi¤erent
between hiring someone today and postponing the hire until tomorrow. This















First consider the case where the …rmpayspositive dividends, i.e. ¸i;t+1 =
¸it = 0. On the left hand side of equation (7) is the net contribution to cash
‡ow in period t from adding a new worker to the labour force. It includes
the real marginal revenue product less the real wage cost. On the right hand
side is the marginal net hiring cost, comprising the di¤erence between the
marginal hiring cost incurred in period t and the discounted expected value
of the marginal hiring cost to be recovered in period t + 1. The latter arises
since the …rm has to incur less expenses in period t+1 in order to obtain the
same number of employees in the subsequent period and onwards. Equation
(7) thus tells us that the marginal bene…t of a new worker should be equal
to the marginal net hiring cost.
Next consider the case when either of the non-negativity constraints on
dividends is binding. The Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the bind-
ing constraint will then take on a positive value, and the term
12(1 + ¸i;t+1)=(1 + ¸it) will work as an additional weight on the right hand
side expression. This means that if the constraint is binding in period t, the
hiring costs to be recovered in t + 1 will be discounted more heavily. The
marginal net hiring cost will hence be perceived by the …rm as higher, and
hirings will be reduced in accordance with that. Consequently, a …rm that is
…nancially constrained in the sense that it has fully exhausted its retentions
will hire fewer workers than a …rm that has not, everything else equal.
Equation (6) is the …rst-order condition for debt, stating that the …rm
should borrow up to the point where it is indi¤erent between one additional
unit of debt and one additional unit of retentions. Assuming that the …rm
pays positive dividends in both periods, the marginal bene…t of issuing one
unit of new debt to …nance dividend payments must be equal to the present
value of repaying the debt plus interest. However, if the dividend constraint
is binding in period t, the marginal cost of new debt will exceed the marginal








1 + (1 ¡ ¿)(it + ABit) ¡ ¼e
t+1
: (8)
Equations (7) and (8) form the theoretical basis for our empirical inves-
tigation in section 5. The empirical speci…cation of the model is derived
below.
133.2 Empirical speci…cation
In order to get a speci…cation that can be estimated, we need a few further
assumptions on explicit functional forms of the revenues, as well as the ad-
justment and agency costs. Following Machin et al. (1993), we assume that
the revenue and adjustment cost functions are given by









where ® and ° are greater than zero9. For the agency cost function, we








for positive values of Bi;t¡1, and zero otherwise. Á is the agency cost para-
meter assumed to be greater than zero.
Di¤erentiating (9), (10), and (11) with respect to Nit, Hit, and Bit, we in-
sert the result into (7) and (8). Under the assumption of constant conditional
covariance between (µ + ¸i;t+1)=(µ + ¸it) and other time t+ 1 variables, (8)
can then be substituted into (7). Using the assumption of rational expecta-
tions on the resulting expression and rearranging yields:
9We use quadratic adjustment costs for mathematical convenience. However, we ac-
knowledge that there is limited empirical support for thisassumption.(See, e.g.,Hamermesh
(1993)).
14° (1 ¡ ±)











(Ni;t+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Nit) =





+ fi + st+1 + "i;t+1; (12)
where Q = f (K;X)N® denotes real sales, fi is a …rm-speci…c …xed e¤ect,
st+1 is a time-speci…c …xed e¤ect, and "i;t+1 is the forecast error, serially
uncorrelated and orthogonal to any information in period t. The …rm-speci…c
e¤ect is included to allow for heterogeneity among …rms due to di¤erences in,
e.g., growth opportunities or the skill of the management. The time-speci…c
e¤ect will capture macroeconomic shocks that are common to all …rms.
Finally, Taylor expanding (12) about the individual mean of the variables
yields the Euler equation for employment to be estimated:





















i;t+1 di¤er only proportionally from fi, st+1, and "i;t+1.10
The reduced form parameters ¯i are related to the structural parameters as
follows:




(1¡±) ¯2 = ¡ª
¯3 = ª












The model is clearly overidenti…ed in terms of the structural parameters,
but we can still say something about the reduced form parameters.. The
model predicts that: ¯1 > 2, ¯2 < ¡1, ¯3 > 0, ¯4 < 0, and ¯5 > 0. Note
that the sum of ¯1 and ¯2 will be greater than one, implying that the signs
of the coe¢cients on Q=N, W, and B=K must be reversed in the long run.
This implies, in particular, that an increase in the debt ratio will have a
negative long-run e¤ect on employment. Note also that the debt to equity
ratio is only expected to enter the equation if the …rm has exhausted all of
its retentions.
4 Estimation and Data
4.1 Methodological considerations
We estimate equation (13) using the Generalized Method of Moments estima-
tor (GMM) developed by Arellano & Bond (1991). This estimator exploits
the linear moment conditions implied by the model. The individual e¤ects
are removed by …rst-di¤erencing the model and the resulting endogeneity
problem is handled by using appropriate instruments.
Since the errors in levels are serially uncorrelated, as implied by ratio-
16nal expectations, the errors in …rst-di¤erences will follow a …rst-order MA-
process. This implies that values of the dependent variable (in levels) and
other right-hand side variables must be lagged at least two time-periods in
order to be uncorrelated with the di¤erenced error term and, thereby, valid
as instruments in the transformed model. As the consistency of the GMM
estimates critically hinges on the validity of the instruments, we test for this
assertion, using the Sargan-test and the Arellano-Bond m2-criterion. The
Sargan-test tests for the null of no correlation between the instruments and
the residuals, while the m2-test tests for the lack of second-order correla-
tion. A corresponding m1-test tests for the lack of …rst-order correlation.
Estimation is carried out using the DPD program for Ox 1.20.11
Unfortunately, there is a tendency for the asymptotic standard errors of
the second-step Arellano-Bond estimator to be downward biased in small
samples. There are two ways of handling this. One could either stick to
the consistent …rst-step estimates, which have better …nite sample properties
but are potentially ine¢cient; or one could go for the e¢cient second-step
estimates and employ a bootstrap t-test, which has better size properties12,
for inference. We make use of both approaches and report the …rst- and
second-step asymptotic tests together with the bootstrap tests.
The idea of the bootstrap test is simple. It amounts to estimating the
distribution of the test statistic by resampling the data. When performing
an asymptotic t-test, the null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic is
11For a description of the programs, see Doornik (1996) and Arellano, Bond & Doornik
(1997).
12See the Monte Carlo evidence in Bergström (1997).
17unlikely to have come from a t-distribution. When performing a bootstrap
test, we …rst need to estimate the distribution of the test statistic. This is
done by treating the data as the population and the estimated parameter
value, say ^ ¯, as the true value. From this ”fake” population, we then create
a large number of samples by randomly drawing observations with replace-
ment, and reestimate the ¯-parameter for each of the new samples (using the
same method as before). The logic of a bootstrap test is that the reestimated
values, say ~ ¯, will on average be equal to the ”true” value, ^ ¯. So by con-
structing t-tests of the null ~ ¯ = ^ ¯ (which we know will be true in repeated
resampling) for all new samples, we may in this way simulate the distribution
of the t-statistic under the true null. This distribution will not only re‡ect
the characteristics of the DGP (data generating process), but also the size of
the original sample.
Forming tests based on the bootstrap distribution has proved to be at
least as reliable as using the asymptotic distribution, and, in most cases,
considerably more reliable.13 GMM-bootstrapping involves a few other tech-
nical obstacles that must be overcome. We do not want go into these issues
here, and refer the reader to Brown & Newey (1995) for a rigorous treatment
of the issues involved.
4.2 Data and sample selection
The data we use is a sample from the CoSta-base which contains annual
income statements and balance sheets of Swedish …rms over the years 1979-
13See e.g. Davidson & MacKinnon (1996).
181994.14 The data material is collected by Statistics Sweden and includes all
manufacturing …rms with more than 20 employees. At times, …rms leave the
sample, either due to bankruptcies or mergers or because they have ”con-
tracted” themselves out from this class of …rms. Since we cannot identify
the cause of why a …rm leaves the sample, we need to restrict our analysis to
those …rms that remain in the sample over the entire period, which would give
us a balanced panel of 16 years. There is, however, a self selection problem
with this approach. By discarding …rms that have ”contracted” themselves
out of the sample, factors with a negative in‡uence on employment will be
underestimated. To cope with this, we use the following sample selection
procedure:
1. Include in the sample only those …rms that have su¢ciently many em-
ployees in the …rst year (1979) to allow the …rms to contract over the
time-period without leaving the sample.
2. Inspect the number of employees for the last observation of each …rm
sampled. If this is less than some critical value, label the …rm ”doubt-
ful”.
3. Select the length of the panel as long as possible, but make sure that
no ”doubtful” …rms are thrown away.
In order to keep as many observations as possible, we choose a design in
which the required number of employees in the …rst year is 50, the critical
14For a thorough description of the CoSta-database, see Hansen (1997).
19number of employees is 30, and the length of the panel is 10 years. This
leaves us with a panel of 479 …rms over the period 1979-1988. Out of the
…rms discarded, three …rms were labelled ”doubtful”; i.e., they had less than
30 employees as their …nal observation. The exclusion of these three will
hardly cause any signi…cant self-selection bias.
The variables used in the empirical analysis include labour, N, real wage
costs, W, productivity, Q=N, and the debt to equity ratio, B=E. Note that
we use the debt to equity ratio instead of the debt to capital ratio, as in the
derivation of the model. This avoids the problems associated with measuring
the value of the capital stock. It may also constitute a better measure of the
…rm’s …nancial strenght, if the …rm has other assets than capital.15
N is measured as the average number of full time employees, which is
roughly the total number of hours worked divided by the working time con-
sidered as standard hours at each …rm. W is obtained by dividing total wage
costs by the number of employees and Q=N is measured as real sales divided
by the number of employees, both of which are de‡ated using the Producer
Price Index at a two digit (SNI) industry level. B=E is calculated using the
book values of debt and equity in accordance with the recommendations of
the Swedish Association of Financial Analysts. The use of book values was
necessary since we have no access to market information. However, if we
want to make a virtue out of this necessity, we could argue that the book
values are more appropriate to use, as those are the …gures that bankers gen-
15For a …rm with no other assets than capital, B=E is simply be a monotonic transfor-
mation of B=K: B=E = (B=K)=(1 ¡ (B=K)):
20erally would audit. A more detailed description of the variables and some
descriptive statistics are given in the data appendix.
5 Results
5.1 Euler equation estimates
We start by estimating equation (13) without allowing for …nancial regimes.16
The results are reported in the …rst three columns of Table 1. As can bee
seen, the speci…cation tests do not indicate any problems that would af-
fect the consistency of the estimates. Even though the test for …rst-order
serial correlation does not indicate a signi…cantly negative correlation as is
expected, both the Sargan and the m2 tests suggest that the instruments
are valid and that the speci…cation is acceptable. The set of instruments in-
cludes values of all variables in levels, lagged up to three periods. While the
inclusion of further lags as instruments increases the e¢ciency of estimation,
it also leads the Sargan test to emphatically reject the speci…cation.
All coe¢cients have the signs that we would expect from the theoretical
model, with one important exception: the coe¢cient on the debt ratio is
negative. Before we address this issue, we may …rst note that the …rst-step
estimates in the …rst column suggest that only the lagged dependent vari-
ables exert any explanatory power in the Euler equation; none of the other
16All estimations in this section have been performed both with and without time-
speci…c …xed e¤ects with virtually the same results. As the time e¤ect in most cases
were individually signi…cant and always jointly signi…cant, we have choosen to present the
estimations including these e¤ects.
21estimates are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. However, considering the fact
that the …rst-step estimates are ine¢cient, this result should not be all that
surprising, and it does not persist in the second-step of estimation. On the
contrary, in some cases the t-statistics associated with the second-step es-
timates are remarkably high, which makes us suspect that these standard
errors may be estimated with a severe downward bias. This suspicion is
supported by the high bootstrap p-values reported in the third column, al-
though one should bear in mind that the bootstrap procedure we used itself
have a tendency to under-reject the null hypothesis. (See Bergström (1997)
for Monte Carlo evidence). Taken together, the evidence seem to suggest
that the variables included do exert some in‡uence upon employment, even
though the signi…cance of the wage costs and the productivity measure are
somewhat ambiguous.
As we noted above, the negative coe¢cient on the debt to equity ratio
(¡0:12) is not consistent with the theoretical model. Therefore, following
our precedent line of arguments, we reestimate the model, now allowing for
the presence of …nancial regimes, with the debt to equity coe¢cients varying
over these. This is done simply by creating two dummy variables which are
interacted with the debt ratio, the …rst picking out those …rms that do not
pay positive dividends in two consecutive years and the second picking out
the remaining …rms. As a direct implication of the theoretical model, we
should expect the debt ratio to be statistically signi…cant only for the subset
of …rms that are not paying positive dividends in two consecutive periods.
Since these …rms are, in some sense, liquidity constrained, their employment
22decisions are likely to be in‡uenced by their …nancial status. The results are
presented in the last three columns of Table 1.
As can be seen, the speci…cation is not rejected by the speci…cations tests,
and the coe¢cients on all variables other than the debt to equity ratio remain
practically the same. In contrast, the debt coe¢cient changes substantially.
For those …rms that are not paying dividends, the debt coe¢cient is now
positive (0:12) as implied by theory, whereas the coe¢cient for dividend-
paying …rms is no longer signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This supports
the hypothesis of a hierarchy of …nance and suggests that …nancial leverage
will only be important in a regime in which internally generated funds are
exhausted.
It should be noted that the bootstrap t-test of the debt coe¢cient associ-
ated with the group of non-dividend paying …rms (p = 0:11) does cast some
doubts on its level of signi…cance. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the potential
size distortion of the bootstrap test and also being reassured by the small
di¤erence between the …rst and second step estimates, we are inclined to
believe that this does not contradict the hypotheses of a hierarchy of …nance.
5.2 Labour demand relation
The main source of disappointment in our empirical model is the violation
of the long run properties suggested by theory: the coe¢cients on lagged
employment do not sum to a value greater than unity. This result, which
by no means is uncommon for empirical Euler equations of this type, makes
the parameter estimates obtained somewhat less clear-cut to interpret. It
23Table 1: Euler Equation of Employment
I. Original Speci…cation II. Financial regimes
Var 1-step 2-step Boot p 1-step 2-step Boot p
N it 0.4949 0.4940 0.4951 0.4949
(3.53) (410) 0.000 (3.54) (377) 0.000
N i;t¡1 0.0821 0.0831 0.0821 0.0832
(2.63) (385) 0.000 (2.63) (329) 0.000
W it 0.7170 0.2465 0.7614 0.2625
(1.56) (5.08) 0.119 (1.54) (4.91) 0.100
Q/N it -0.0231 -0.0095 -0.0236 -0.0101




it 0.1175 0.1218 0.114
(0.42) (6.54)
B/Ediv
it -8.6383 -4.8117 0.632
(-0.76) (-1.61)
m1: -1.07 S1(65): 0.000 m1:-1.07 S1(64): 0.000
m2: -1.23 S2(65): 0.149 m2:-1.23 S2(64): 0.163
Wald (7): 0.000 Wald (7): 0.000
Notes:
(i) GMM estimates, obtained using DPD for Ox 1.20. For a description of the programs,
see Doornik (1996) and Arellano et al. (1997).
(ii) t-statistics are reported in parentheses. They are computed using the asymptotic
standard errors, which are obtained using a heteoscedasticity-robust variance-covariance
matrix. Boot p gives the p-values of the corresponding bootstrap t-test. Throughout 400
bootstrap replications have been used.
(iii) All regressions include time dummies. Wald gives the p-value of an asymptotic Wald-
test of the joint signi…cance of the dummies. Under the null of no relationship, the Wald
statistic is asymptotically distributed as Â2(k), where k is the number of coe¢cients tested.
(iv) m1 and m2 are test statistics for …rst- and second-order serial correlation in residuals in
…rst di¤erences. Both are asymptotically standard normal under the nulls of, respectively,
no …rst- and second-order correlation.
(v) S1(S2) gives the p-value of the asymptotic …rst (second) step Sargan test of the over-
identifying restrictions (validity of instruments). Under the null of valid restrictions, the
Sargan statistic is asymptotically distributed as Â2(p-k), where p is the number of moment
conditions and k is the number of coe¢cients estimated. The set of instruments includes N
and Q/N lagged 2 and 3 years, B/E and W lagged 1, 2, and 3 years, and all time dummies.
24would therefore be desirable to estimate the labour demand relation in the
form of a behavioural function, as a complement to the Euler equation analy-
sis. Because of the involved structure of the model, we have not come up
with a closed form solution for such a labour demand relation. Instead, we
have estimated a bare-bones log-linear labour demand equation to which we
have added our …nancial variables ad hoc, in the same manner as in e.g.
Nickell & Nicolitsas (1994). Following their line of arguments, we should
expect …nancial leverage of the previous period to exert a negative in‡uence
on labour demand, something which also is intuitively consistent with our
previous model.
Allowing for …nancial regimes in the same manner as before, the empirical
model we estimate is based on the equation




i;t¡1 + fi + st + "it
where lower case letters indicate logs17. We then add su¢cient dynamics to
the equation, in order to obtain a valid speci…cation, and estimate the result-
ing equation in …rst di¤erences as previously18. The main di¤erence between
this speci…cation and the Euler equation representation, is the introduction
of contemporaneous wage costs.
As can be seen from the results in Table 2, this speci…cation is approved
17For a discussion on the endogeneity problem which makes it necessary to use lags of
the …nancial variable, see Nickell & Nicolitsas (1994).
18Introducing the productivity measure or industry speci…c trends did not change the
results substantially. We therefore report the results from the more parsimonious model
in which these regressors are omitted.
25Table 2: Labour Demand Equation
I. Financial Regimes

























m1: -3.96 S1(128): 0.000
m2: 0.93 S2(128): 0.416
Wald (7): 0.000
Notes:
(i) GMM estimates, obtained using DPD for Ox 1.20.
(ii) The set of instruments includes all lags available from period t-2 for n, w, and q/n,
and all lags available from period t-1 for B/E, as well as all time dummies.
(iii) See the notes in table 1 for further explanations.
26by all tests performed. Note that the m1 now indicates a signi…cant negative
…rst-order serial correlation, as one would expect fromtaking …rst di¤erences.
Looking at the parameter estimates, they do resemble those of a labour de-
mand relation with a fairly low short run employment-wage elasticity and
with a long run elasticity at roughly -0.6, which seems rather reasonable. Fur-
thermore, the negative signs of the debt coe¢cients of non-dividend paying
…rms are consistent with the …ndings of Nickell & Nicolitsas (1994), although
the magnitude of the coe¢cients may appear to be rather small. However,
the summary statistics in the data appendix tell us that the variable we have
chosen to capture the agency costs may potentially increase quite drastically
for individual …rms; an increase of one standard deviation, starting out from
the mean, implies a 400 per cent increase of this ratio. The actual e¤ects
from changes in this ratio onto employment may hence be substantial even
though the coe¢cients appear small.
The evidence on statistical signi…cance of the debt to equity ratio of div-
idend paying …rms is ambiguous. On the one hand, the …rst and second step
asymptotic t-tests suggest that the coe¢cients are statistically signi…cant.
On the other hand, the bootstrap t-test suggests they are not. In view of our
earlier result and the potential size distortion of the bootstrap test, we are
in this case inclined to believe that some e¤ects are actually present. This
result is, of course, not consistent with the theory of …nancial regimes, which
predicts that …nancial leverage should be irrelevant for the employment deci-
sion of dividend paying …rms. But even so, there is a clear di¤erence between
the two subsets of …rms. The debt-coe¢cient of non-dividend paying …rms
27is negative in coherence with our a priori belief, whereas the debt coe¢cient
of dividend paying …rms is positive, a result which …ts badly into the theo-
retical framework of agency costs. We make no attempts trying to interpret
this result, but just note that there are important di¤erences in the in‡uence
of …nancial leverage between …rms in di¤erent …nancial regimes.
6 Conclusions
Using the hierarchy of …nance approach, we have derived an Euler equation
model of employment suggesting a mechanism through which the …nancial
policy of …rms may a¤ect their hiring decisions and, thus, their labour de-
mand. This model was estimated using a large panel of Swedish manufac-
turing …rms over the years 1979-88. A few points are worth stressing:
² In accordance with earlier studies, we …nd that …nancial leverage exert
an important in‡uence on the hiring decisions of …rms. The main
conclusion is that this e¤ect is related to which …nancial regime the
…rm …nds itself in. Financial leverage only appears to be important
for those …rms that are in a regime in which retentions have been fully
exhausted.
² The Euler equation of employment gives rise to a reasonably well spec-
i…ed model, although the long-run properties of the model may be
questionable. However, estimating a bare-bones log-linear labour de-
mand relation as a complement to the Euler equation analysis, we get
28qualitatively similar results, giving some support for the hierarchy of
…nance hypothesis.
² The bootstrap procedure we have used here con…rms that the down-
ward bias of the second-step estimates might be an important problem.
However, as the bootstrap t-test itself appears to be somewhat under-
sized, inference may still not be clear-cut. Nevertheless, we believe
that bootstrap tests are useful and essential complements to asymp-
totic tests in applications of this type.
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33A Data Appendix
A.1 The Sample
The sample we use consists of 479 Swedish companies observed over the years 1979 – 1988
and is drawn from the CoSta base, which contains annual income statements and balance
sheet for a large number of …rms. It was selected according to the following criteria, upon
which our results are conditional:
² Only …rms in the manufacturing industry is included, i.e., those belonging to SNI
categories 31–38.
² Only …rms with more than 50 employees are included. This is due to the sample
selection problem which is thoroughly described in section 4.3 of this paper.
² Firms must have strictly positive wages and sales. This criterion is applied in order
to exclude obviously erroneous data.
² Employment must not ‡uctuate with more than a factor of 3 between two consec-
utive years. This requirement is used to eliminate changes in employment which is
due to restructuring of companies, rather than to the factors that we seek to study.
This restriction, however, proved to be non-restrictive in the sample selection.
A.2 De…nitions of Variables
The variables used in this paper are the following.
² Employment (Nit) is expressed as the number of ”e¤ective” workers according to
the de…nition of the Central Swedish Accounting Board (Bokföringsnämnden), BFN
34R4. It is calculated as total hours worked divided by the ”normal” working time of
an employee. CoSta: Var001 Mean: 424.3 Std dev: 1661
² Wage costs (Wit) is total wage costs, including payroll taxes, divided by the number
of employees. It is expressed in real terms using the Producer Price Index at a two
digit (SNI) industry level. CoSta: Var004/(Var001£PPIjt) Mean: 148.9 Std dev:
24.46
² Sales (Qit) includes both domestic and international sales. It is expressed in
real terms using the Producer Price Index at a two digit industry level. CoSta:
Var005/PPIjt Mean: 662.3 Std dev: 579.3
² Debt (Bit) is computed as the sum of current payables and long-term liabilities to
corporate group members, current loan liabilities, and other long-term liabilities.
Costa: Var078+Var084+Var081+Var086. Mean: 87669.16 Std dev: 668932.7
² Adjusted equity (Eit) is computed as the sum of book-value of equity and tax
adjusted value of untaxed reserves less the dividends declared. The corporate tax
rate used in calculations was set to 0.5. A few observations (eight) quoted negative
equity, but rather than deleting the entire time series of these …rms, we imputed
these observations by the value of equity per employee in the lowest percentile
observed, times the number of employees. Costa: Var108+(1-¿)Var103-Var110.
Mean: 91181.2 Std dev:506053.6
² Debt to equity rato(Bit=Eit) Mean: 1.579276 Std dev: 4.435337
² Producer Price Index (Pjt) at a two digit industry level. Source: Statistics Sweden
35